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This study examines spousal matching for females in second-order marriages. 
It is based on detailed data from longitudinal Swedish population data 
registers. We aim to follow women who marry, divorce, and subsequently 
remarry compared with females who marry and stay married over the course of 
the study interval. The earnings of both groups are modeled through regression 
analysis in the year prior to their marriages along with the earnings of each 
husband. The residuals from the regressions represent unobservables in the 
process of earnings generation. From the regressions we obtain spouse-to-be 
pairs of earnings residuals and we measure the correlation of residuals for each 
marital regime. Overall, we find significant positive correlations for all three of 
the marital partitions. The correlation tends to be smaller for the first of a 
sequence of marriages for women who divorce than for women who marry and 
stay so. For the second of the successive marriages, however, the correlation of 
the residuals is larger than that for women who marry but once. We also find 
evidence of “matching” between successive husbands. Women who marry 
men with unmeasured positive earnings capacities, in the event of divorce, 
tend to select and match in a similar fashion the second time around. 
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I  Introduction 
 
In the final decades of the twentieth century, many Western countries 
witnessed marked changes in the timing of marriage and the frequency of 
marital dissolution. These phenomena occurred at the same time social 
scientists developed interest in the determinants and consequences of marital 
formation and divorce. Economists and sociologists in particular have devoted 
attention to the effects on marriage of labor force outcomes such as 
employment and earnings. Viewing marriage as an institution in the context of 
markets, Becker (1974; 1981) and subsequent researchers focused on factors 
that tend to match individuals as spouses. A natural outgrowth of that endeavor 
was research concerning determinants of separation and divorce, as 
exemplified by Becker, Landes and Michael (1977). These early studies were 
followed by a substantial volume of research on marital matching and 
determinants and consequences of divorce. 
 
Accompanying the trend in marital disruption has been pervasive incidence of 
remarriage; a substantial proportion of individuals who end their first 
marriages tend to enter subsequent unions. The remarriage phenomenon has 
engendered efforts to delineate socioeconomic factors and individual 
characteristics that explain formation of second marriages. Early examples in 
this literature include Thornton (1978), Hutchens (1979), and Wolf and 
MacDonald (1979). What has been largely unexplored in the remarriage 
literature is the phenomenon of second-spouse matching and how it compares 
to first-marriage matching. An exception is Mueller and Pope (1980), who 
compare occupational status among successive husbands of twice-married 
women. Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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This study attempts to extend the literature by examining spouse matching in 
second order marriages of females. It exploits detailed data registers from the 
Swedish population, which are compiled by Statistics Sweden and the Labor 
Market Board of Sweden. The registers are longitudinal in nature, which 
allows us to follow a sample of females through time. For the subset of women 
who first marry, then dissolve their marriages and subsequently enter into 
second marriages, we can examine the statistical anatomy of the successive 
matches; our particular interest, as we explain in Section III below, is matching 
on the basis of unmeasured determinants of earnings, which manifest 
themselves in residuals from estimated earnings equations. The estimates are 
based on regression based pairings of females with their respective first 
husbands and, later in the longitudinal file, with their second husbands. 
Because the data allow us to track both spouses back to years preceding the 
marriages, we are able to examine matching in its true sense, i.e., prior to the 
formation of each marriage. This “back to the future” feature of the data has 
previously been exploited by Nakosteen, Westerlund and Zimmer (2004), who 
restrict their attention to first marriages. Accordingly, for purposes of 
comparison, in our empirical analysis we likewise present estimates for a 
separate sample of once-married women. 
Although the principle contribution of this research is to provide insight into 
the a priori matching process of a given female with two successive husbands, 
it also creates an opportunity to examine the “matching” process that unites the 
husbands. Although the husbands clearly do not choose one another in the 
marriage market, the phenomenon that potentially links them is their common 
selection by the same female at two different points in time. The sample design 
of this study is unique in facilitating analysis of the extent, if any, to which this 
indirect matching of successive husbands manifests itself in the process of 





The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an 
overview of previous research. Since we focus on the phenomenon of spouse 
selection in the context of remarriage, our review of the traditional literature 
concerning determinants of marriage and divorce is somewhat perfunctory, as 
we refer the reader to references contained in selected papers from that body of 
research. Section III establishes the statistical framework for the empirical 
analysis, while Section IV presents estimates of the critical parameters. Section 
V summarizes and concludes the study. 
 
II Background 
This section presents an overview of selected previous research that motivates 
the present study. For our purposes, the most succinct classification of the 
literature is with respect to (1) marital matching; (2) determinants of divorce; 
and (3) studies of remarriage. 
Marital Matching and Sorting of Spouses 
In a paper that launched a substantial amount of modern research on marriage, 
Becker (1974) argued that spouses tend to match on the basis of market and 
home specialization. His hypothesis is that optimal marital sorting is based on 
comparative advantage within the spouse pair; husbands, typically possessing 
greater earning potential, engage in mar k e t  w o r k  t o  e x p l oit the advantage, 
while wives specialize in home production and family rearing. Empirical 
testing of Becker’s hypothesis has relied in part on earnings regressions for 
married couples, using the models to obtain earnings residuals. The negative 
correlation implied by Becker’s specialization hypothesis has not been a Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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common finding. Smith (1979) obtained residual correlations of 0.098 for 
white couples and 0.035 for blacks. Becker (1981) estimated partial 
correlations for spouses’ wages, controlling for age and schooling, obtained 
0.32 for white couples and 0.24 for blacks. These results are suggestive of 
positive spouse sorting, a result that is further supported by Lam (1988). 
One shortcoming of residual correlations for existing marriages is that they are 
likely reflective of factors that manifest themselves after marriage, and thus 
might not be informative about the sorting process that paired the spouses to 
begin with. This challenge is addressed by Nakosteen, Westerlund and Zimmer 
(2004), who use the Swedish register data to estimate residual correlations for 
spouses based on the period immediately prior to marriage. Using two distinct 
marriage cohorts, their estimates range from 0.203 for the full sample to 0.08 
for a sample restricted on the basis of data imputations. These estimates, which 
differ significantly from zero, are further evidence of positive marital sorting, 
again contrary to Becker’s (1974) original hypothesis. Readers may refer to the 
above cited paper for further references in the marital sorting literature. 
Divorce and Remarriage 
In early work on marital dissolution, Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) view 
married persons as if they assess the expected gains from remaining married 
relative to the costs associated with divorce. Dissolution results when expected 
utility from remaining married is less than expected utility after divorce. 
Marriages that are formed at young ages, reflecting a period of abbreviated 
search for a suitable spouse, are relatively prone to divorce. Traits that tend to 
raise the utility from remaining married, thereby sustaining the union, include 
marriage-specific capital in the form of children or household wealth. Becker, 
Landes and Michael (1977) also postulate that marriages tend to fail in the face 





by Starkey (1991). Following the theme of earnings stability, Weiss and Willis 
(1997) find that unexpectedly high earnings of husbands tend to reduce the 
likelihood of divorce, whereas in the case of wives, earnings “surprises” have 
the opposite effect. Readers may refer to the latter paper for additional 
references in the literature on marriage dissolution. 
Previous research on remarriage has attempted to identify factors that match 
individuals with new partners after the end of their first marriages. In view of 
the often adverse economic effects of divorce on women, much attention has 
focused on female transitions back to marriage. Smock (1990), using data from 
the 1988 National Survey of Families and Households, compares the 
remarriage experiences of blacks and whites. Her evidence indicates that less 
educated blacks experience a diminished rate of return to marriage, while no 
significant education effect is apparent for whites. On the other hand, 
remarriage prospects of whites tend to diminish with age, while there is no 
significant age effect among blacks. For both race groups, those with three or 
more children and those who separate at relatively older ages are less likely to 
remarry. 
Chiswick and Lehrer (1990) analyze a sample of women from the 1982 
National Survey of Family Growth. Among whites, transitions to marriage are 
more likely among those with no children and whose first marriages were of 
relatively short duration, and less likely for those older than 28 years of age. A 
similar age pattern holds for blacks, but blacks appear not to have an adverse 
effect of longer durations in their first marriages, and unlike whites there is no 
apparent effect associated with absence of children. Chiswick and Lehrer’s 
model implies two hypotheses concerning husbands in second marriages. First, 
the economic status of the second husband should be positively associated 
with the duration of the wife’s first marriage. As far as we can determine, this 
has not been subjected to empirical scrutiny. Second, the second husband’s Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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economic status should be negatively associated with the number of children 
from the wife’s first marriage. Modest support for that proposition has been 
reported by Duncan and Hoffman (1985: Table 14.1), using data from the 
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In a finding that bears 
directly on this study, Duncan and Hoffman also report a strongly significant 
positive relation between earnings of the second husband and earnings of the 
first husband.  
Hutchens (1979) analyzes the effect of welfare receipt (in the form of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children) on remarriage prospects of female 
household heads. Using data from the PSID, his principal findings indicate that 
welfare receipt is associated with diminished remarriage prospects. In addition, 
marriage transitions decline with age and are lower among nonwhites. Wolf 
and MacDonald (1979), in a departure from other studies, examine the relation 
between earnings and remarriage for men. Using a sample from the state of 
Wisconsin, their findings indicate that males’ remarriage prospects are not 
related to the level of or variation in their earnings, and similarly not by their 
earnings relative to appropriate peer groups. However, measures of permanent 
income show a positive impact on remarriage prospects.  
Mueller and Pope (1980) analyze differences in occupational status between 
successive husbands of twice married women; as such, their paper appears to 
be the most closely related to the present study, insofar as it reveals something 
indirectly about the matching process characterizing the behavior of twice-
married women. Based on the 1970 National Fertility Survey, Mueller and 
Pope cross classify the occupations of women’s first and second husbands. 
Their results indicate that approximately 50 percent of remarrying women 
“marry up” in the sense of matching with second husbands in higher 





and the remaining 30 percent experience no change in husbands’ occupational 
status. 
These studies provide insight concerning the process of remarriage. This is 
potentially important for purposes of public policy, given the substantially 
lower incomes of households headed by single mothers who are divorced or 
never married, and since marriage represents a potential escape from poverty 
for single mothers and their children. What the remarriage literature has not yet 
addressed is the issue of marital matching in second marriages. Knowledge of 
the matching process can contribute to better understanding of the extent, if 
any, to which matching in second marriages differs from first marriages. In 
particular, given the pervasiveness of higher-order marriages in many 
countries, improved understanding of the sorting process that brings second 
spouses together can be informative about the long term stability of second 
versus first marriages. The following section describes a statistical framework 
in which that question can be addressed for the Swedish data. 
 
III Statistical  Framework 
The unit of observation in this study is an initially married female, and the data 
record includes information on as many as two husbands. As we noted in 
Section I, we partition the sample into those whose marriages remain intact for 
the duration of the sample period (hereafter referred to as “once-married”), and 
those who experience dissolution and subsequently remarry (hereafter “twice-
married”). We observe the twice-married females at two points in time, 
immediately prior to the first and second marriages. We also observe a 


















1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ε β + =      (2) 
where  fi Y refers to the logarithm of annual earnings for female i.   The 
superscript refers to the period preceding the first marriage which in this case 
ultimately culminates in divorce. On the right hand side,  fi x denotes a vector 
of explanatory variables and  f β is a conformable vector of unknown 
coefficient parameters. The random error term  fi ε is normally distributed with 
zero mean and unknown variance  2
1 | D f ε σ . Equation (2) represents the analogous 
equation for the first husband, with variables and parameters subscripted 
accordingly and with the normally distributed error term possessing zero mean 
along with variance 
2
1 | D m ε σ  .   
 
For the second marriage of the same woman, the pair of earnings equations is 
represented as: 





fi x Y ε β + =       (3) 





mi x Y ε β + =  ,     (4) 
with analogous subscripting and superscripting. Here, the error terms possess 
respective variances 
2
2 | D f ε σ  and 
2
2 | D m ε σ .  It is worth repeating that, inherent in 
the sample design, the data that generate equations (3) and (4) are recorded 
after the dissolution of the first marriage but before the inception of the 
second. In that sense, in both cases the model knows the marriage will dissolve 
before the spouses themselves do.  






For stable marriages, the pair of earnings equations is specified as: 





fi x Y ε β + =
     (5)
 





mi x Y ε β + =  ,     (6) 
with the S superscript signifying a stable marriage for the duration of the 
sample period. The other symbols are defined in a manner analogous to (1) – 
(4), and the error terms possess respective variances denoted by 
2
|S f ε σ  and 
2
|S m ε σ . 
 
The data set permits estimation of equations (1) – (4) for the sample partition 
of twice-married women and equations (5) – (6) for the partition of once-
married women. From these regressions we obtain spouse-to-be pairs of 
earnings residuals, which represent estimates of unmeasured disturbances to 
earnings for each individual. The emphasis on unmeasured attributes is due to 
the nature of the marriage experience as it relates to earnings. In one respect it 
is a matter of course that measured earnings of spouses tend to be correlated. 
For example, it is well known that individuals tend to marry partners with 
similar levels of formal schooling, and of similar ethnicity, which are in turn 
correlated with earnings. They tend to marry persons similar in age, and 
earnings progress with age as they gain work experience. Moreover, spouses 
reside in the same region and therefore share the economic fortunes of the 
regional economy. Consequently, our preferred measure of marital matching, 
following Becker (1981), Smith (1979), and others, is the estimated correlation 
between residuals. The residuals capture latent characteristics of individuals 
that affect earnings but are not accounted for by explanatory variables such as 
schooling, age, or region of residence. Although not observed by the 
researcher, these characteristics are likely visible to potential spouses, and they 
include traits such as confidence, ambition, possible family connections that Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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impact earnings, and mental or emotional health. Our essential premise is that, 
in addition to exerting an unmeasured positive impact on earnings, such traits 
increase the attractiveness of individuals as potential marriage partners.  
 
The three sets of regressions described above produce three estimated 
correlations between spouses, and they permit a fourth one of interest, namely 
the correlation between first and second husbands for twice-married women. 
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The numerators in each expression represent covariances between the 
respective error terms identified in the subscripts. In the first, second, and 
fourth cases, positive estimates indicate presence of spouse selection on the 
basis of similar earnings traits: individuals who for unmeasured reasons tend to 
earn above the regression corrected mean tend to select as spouses those with 
similar earnings tendencies.  Negative estimates, on the other hand, are 
indicative of specialization by spouses in the spirit of Becker’s (1974) 
hypothesis. We have an interest in the comparative magnitudes of the first two 
cases, as they provide evidence of the extent to which the matching process 
evolves, if at all, between first and second marriages. The third parameter 
conveys a different dimension of matching. What the two husbands have in 





correlation would indicate that, if the first husband exhibits substantial 
unmeasured strength in earnings, there is a tendency for the second one to be 
similarly above the mean. 
 
 
IV  Data and Sample 
 
We estimate income equations and analyze the pre-marital residual 
correlations using longitudinal data with yearly observations 1990-2003 on a 
larger sample of married or cohabitating couples. From the total Swedish 
population in the year 2001 we sampled all females aged 20-65 who were  
married or cohabitating in that year, and who were living as single at least once 
during 1990-2000. Using family identification codes we merged all males 
married or cohabitating at least once with at least one individual in the sample 
of females. This means that we confine the analysis to female-male couples 
and exclude the relatively few observations of same sex registered partnerships 
from our sample.  
 
Cohabitation is common in Sweden, it is generally accepted, and having 
children without being married is not controversial. The variable indicating 
family status is subject to measurement error in that cohabitation is only 
registered if the couple has at least one common child living in the household. 
This is most likely of minor importance here, since most cases of childless 
cohabitation represent short lived relationships between relatively young 
individuals. For the sake of simplicity, from this point we use the terms 
married and marriage synonymous with cohabitating and cohabitation.  
 
In the sampling process we encountered a small sample of females being 
married with the same person in sequences,  with one year registered as single 
in between. These observations are presumably the result of coding errors or Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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cases were children in cohabitating couples moves in and out from the 
household. Therefore, we classified these observations as stable couples as 
long as the female repeatedly became “remarried” with the same male. Our 
final sample consists of 367,834 females who married only once, and 71,297 
who married at least twice 1990-2000.  
 
Of the latter sample, we have pre-marriage observations for both first and 
second marriage for 24 089 females.
1 For the females married only once we 
identified 361 272 husbands and for the females married twice we identified 
68 272 husbands. We are not able to observe pre-marriage attributes of the first 
husband for marriages taking place before 1991. This limitation leaves us with 
23 450 observations that include husband’s attributes before the first as well as 
before the second marriage. The samples are reduced somewhat in the 
statistical analysis because of missing values and the requirement of positive 
pre-marriage earnings to be included in the estimation of income equations. 
The exact numbers of remaining observations are given in each step of the 
analysis.  
 
Table 1 contains variable definitions and descriptive statistics for variables 
included in the earnings regressions. The explanatory variables include age and 
its square, indicators for the presence of dependent children, region of 
residence, and nativity of birth. The table presents sample means and standard 
deviations for the sample of once-married spouses, limited to those with pre-
marital earnings of more than 50,000 SEK. Descriptive statistics for wives and 
husbands in first and second marriages are given in table A1 in the appendix. 
This partition of the data contains individuals whose average age is in their 
early 30’s, the average slightly larger for men than for women.   
 
                                                 
1 The difference is due to the fact that the first marriage took place before 1991 and therefore not 





Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics. Once Married 
Couples.  
Variable Description  Males  Females 








Education Reference category = maximum 9 years 
primary school. 
  
High school education Dummy variable = 1 if maximum education 





University education  Dummy variable = 1 if maximum education 





Dependent children Reference category = no dependent children 
in the household. 
  
Children Dummy variable = 1 if there are children 





Small children  Dummy variable = 1 if there are children 





Region of residence Reference category = Stockholm region    
East Mid Sweden Dummy variable if residence is in Uppsala, 






Småland Dummy variable if residence is in 






South Sweden  Dummy variable if residence is in Blekinge 





West Sweden Dummy variable if residence is in Halland 





North Mid Sweden Dummy variable if residence is in 





Mid  Norrland  Dummy variable if residence is in 





Upper  Norrland    Dummy variable if residence is 












Number of obs.   300,054  294,896 
Note: Income > 50,000 SEK .The first entry in each cell is the sample mean. Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviations. Sample sizes differ due to earnings restrictions (see Section 
IV) 
 Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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Approximately half of the sample has an high school education or a university 
degree, and most of the population lives in the three highly urbanized areas of 
Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg. We restrict the samples to spouses with 
positive earnings. The problem of sample selection bias induced by excluding 
nonworking women does not seem to be problematic in the case of Sweden, 
since its labor force participation rate for females is one of the highest in the 
world. There is, however, some concern with including all earners, since many 
individuals with near-zero earnings might be part time workers or sporadic in 
their labor force participation. In order to examine our results by income level, 
we present estimates for a sequence of subsets of the sample based on income 
restrictions. In addition to the complete sample, we progressively exclude 
individuals with earnings less that 10,000 SEK; 25,000 SEK; 50,000 SEK; 
75,000 SEK; and finally 100,000 SEK. The sample reductions are based on 
individuals. In particular, we do not use what would have been the more 
restrictive criterion of both spouses satisfying the respective minimum 
thresholds as joint requirements for inclusion in the sample. For that reason, 
the samples that produce the regression equations differ in size between 
husbands and wives. To produce the residual correlations within each 
restricted sample, however, we use only the residual pairs for which both 
spouses satisfy the respective earnings restrictions.  
 
We estimate the earnings equations separately for the subsamples of once 
married and, and for those who re-marry, thus allowing for different 






                                                 





V  Results of Estimation 
 
Estimates of the regression model for the sample of once-married spouses are 
presented in Table 2. The estimates correspond to the minimum earnings 
threshold of 50,000 SEK per year. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of annual earnings. Entries in parentheses are standard errors, which 
confirm the strong significance of all explanatory variables. The estimates for 
both genders reveal patterns that are commonly found in cross section   
estimates of earnings. Earnings increase with age, a proxy for work 
experience, and they do so with the familiar concave trajectory. As expected, 
the education coefficients reflect positive returns to schooling relative to the 
category of the minimum compulsory nine years. The region coefficients show 
consistent earnings deficiencies relative to Stockholm, the largest being 
associated with North Mid Sweden and the Norrland regions. The coefficient 
associated with origin status indicates a substantial advantage for native 
Swedes, particularly among men. The R square statistics are consistent with 
most cross section earnings studies, revealing that more than 24 percent of 
sample variation in log earnings is explained by the variables in the model.  
The unexplained portion, subsumed in the residual, forms the unmeasured 
basis on which we calibrate spouse matching in the form of residual 
correlations, as described in Section III. 
 
Proceeding in this fashion, we obtained analogous regression estimates for the 
sample partition of twice-married women, paired in succession with their 
respective husbands. In each case we performed the estimations for the sample 
subsets defined by the progressive earnings exclusions, as described in Section 
III. For the sake of brevity, we do not present the results of those 23 pairs of  
regressions here. After obtaining the residuals, we estimate the residual 
correlations, which are presented in Table 3.  
 Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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Table 2. Estimates of the Earnings Model: Once Married Couples.  












































































       
R-Square  0.235    0.288   
s.e.  0.366    0.315   
N  300,054    294,896   
Note: Earnings > 50,000 SEK. Figures in parentheses are absolute standard errors. Marital 
year dummies omitted from listing. Sample sizes differ due to earnings restrictions.  
 
 





Several noteworthy patterns emerge in the table. Most noticeable is the 
persistence of positive signs, indicating a tendency for matching by spouses on 
the basis of similar rather than contrasting unmeasured earnings capacity. The 
estimates, all of which differ significantly from zero, range from  114 . 0 ˆ = ρ  
(first marriages of twice-married women, incomes restricted above 50,000 
SEK) to  228 . 0 ˆ = ρ  (second marriages of twice marrieds, incomes above 
100,000 SEK). Positive matching occurs across both marriage regimes and for 
all income categories. Looking first at the once-married sample, the 
correlations generally increase in size as the sample is restricted to higher 
income thresholds. The correlation for the subgroup of highest earners, 
203 . 0 ˆ = ρ , is more than 50 percent larger than that of the population as a 
whole; in this select group, positive matching is particularly strong. These 
estimates contrast with the first marriages in the twice-married sample in two 
respects. First, they are larger in every earnings-excluded sample than their 
counterparts in the population of unstable marriages. Second, the gap between 
the estimates increases, albeit somewhat unevenly, as the exclusion threshold 
increases.  
 
For the twice married sample, the correlations reveal an added dimension. For 
all the income-excluded samples, the correlation for second marriages exceeds 
that for first marriages,
3 and the discrepancy tends to grow with income. For 
the lowest threshold (Y > 10,000 SEK), the second correlation exceeds the first 
by 9 percent; for the most select income group, the gap increases to 42 percent. 
Marital matching is persistently positive, even in unstable marriages, and it 
tends to strengthen both with income and in the context of second marriages.  
 
 
                                                 
3 F-tests indicate that the hypothesis of equality of parameters is rejected. Twice Chosen: Spouse Matching and Earnings… 
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Table 3. Estimated Residual Correlations 
Income Restriction  Marriage 
Order 
 
Twice Married:  
Husband and Wife 




f ε ε ρ
 




f ε ε ρ  
Twice Married: 
First Husband and 
Second Husband 




m ε ε ρ  
Once Married: 
Husband and Wife 




f ε ε ρ  






















N= 47 705 
(.177) 
























N= 39 303 
(.000) 


























Note: All correlations are significant at the one-percent level or lower. P-values within 
parenthesis are for the test of difference relatively to the correlation pertaining to the first 
marriage among those who marry twice. Calculations based on Fishers’ r to z transformation.  
The number of observations for the first marriage among females with at least two marriages is 
lower than the number of observations for the second marriage. The reason for this is that some 
first marriages took place before 1990. Family codes are only available from 1990 and the 
husbands can not be traced with accuracy in the population registers. Throughout, if nothing else 
is stated, our estimations are based on couples marrying between 1991 and 2003, and the pre-
marriage earnings as single is estimated on observations the year before marriage 1990-2002.  





The estimates are also revealing about the quasi matching of successive 
husbands. As we noted in Section II, this represents association between 
unmeasured earnings capacity between two successive husbands. The 
correlations display a pronounced upward trend as the sample is increasingly 
restricted on the basis of income, indicating that the quasi matching is stronger 
among men with higher earnings. Looking for example at the third earnings 
exclusion sample (Y > 50,000 SEK), the estimated correlation is 0.146. What 
is particularly striking is that the estimate exceeds the correlation between the 
wife, who is common to both marriages, and her first husband. Thus the 
matching of husbands is at least as strong as was the husband-wife matching in 
the first marriage. This estimate is also similar in magnitude to the spouse 
matching for stable marriages in the same earnings exclusion category; the 
latter estimate, 0.164, exceeds the husband matching estimate by only 12 
percent. This contrast remains intact for the two highest income exclusions as 
well. Stated differently, when the sample excludes the lowest earners, first and 
second husbands display an extent of matching that is closer to that of stable 
couples than is the matching in the first husband’s marriage.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the matching estimates for second marriages 
exceed their counterparts among once married for earnings exclusions above 
25,000 SEK. It is tempting to take this as further evidence of stronger 
matching in second marriages. However, the comparison holds only above the 
25,000 SEK threshold, which begs explanation; more important is the lack of 
control, as this comparison does not have the advantage of a common wife as a 
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VI  Assessment and Summary 
 
In this study, we follow women who marry, divorce, and subsequently 
remarry. We also study their counterparts who marry and stay married over the 
course of the study interval.  The earnings of both groups are modeled with 
regression analysis in the year prior to their marriages, as are the earnings of 
each husband. Our focus is on the correlation of the residuals from the 
earnings regression of each marital pair. The residuals represent unobservables 
in the process of earnings generation, and we measure this correlation for each 
marital regime.  We find significant, positive correlations for all three of the 
marital partitions, in orders of magnitude that are consistent with previous 
studies.  Further, the correlation tends to be smaller for the first of a sequence 
of marriages for women who divorce than for women who marry and stay so. 
For the second of the successive marriages, however, the correlation of the 
residuals is larger than that for women who marry but once.  We also find 
evidence of “matching” between successive husbands, which leads to a useful 
inference. Women who marry men with unmeasured positive earnings 
capacities, in the event of divorce, tend to select and match in a similar fashion 
the second time around; if anything, that tendency is stronger in the second 
marriage, and it becomes more pronounced in samples that progressively 
exclude low earners. Another intriguing result is that, for samples exclusive of 
low earners, the strength of quasi matching between successive husbands is at 
least as large and indeed might exceed matching between first husbands and 
first wives. 
 
In view of the substantial incidence of marriage dissolution and remarriage in 
most Western countries, these issues are of substantial importance for policy. 
First is the issue of child and family poverty. Since dissolution tends to exert 
particular economic hardship on females and the children in their custody, a 





tends to mitigate the divorce consequences most effectively for those women 
who are relatively strong earners to begin with. Second, as strong earners tend 
to match over time, whether in first or second marriages, there can arise subtle 
shifts in the distribution of income occasioned by the continuous sorting of 
strong earners. 
 
There is potential for additional research in this area. One question concerns 
the apparent strengthening of matching between first and second marriages for 
those who dissolve their first marriages. It would be useful to corroborate this 
phenomenon from other data sources, in particular for several countries. More 
important, assuming some independent corroboration, is the question of why 
this occurs. Whether it arises from learning that takes place in the first 
marriage, producing a type of economic discernment in the search for a second 
spouse, or more simply that spouses view second marriages in a fundamentally 
different way than first marriages, or perhaps for other reasons, remains an 
interesting question for research. 





Becker, Gary S. 1974. A Theory of Marriage. In  Theodore W. Schultz (ed.), 
Economics of the Family: 299-344. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Becker, Gary S. 1981. A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1981. 
 
Becker, Gary, Elisabeth Landes and Robert Michael 1977. An Economic 
Analysis of Marital Instability Journal of Political Economy 85, 1141-
1187. 
 
Chiswick, Carmel U., and Evelyn L. Lehrer. 1990. On Marriage-Specific 
Human Capital: Its Role as a Determinant of Remarriage. Journal of 
Population Economics 3, 193-213. 
 
Duncan, Greg J., and Saul D. Hoffman. 1985. Economic Consequences of 
Marital Instability. Chapter 14 in Martin David and Timothy Smeeding 
(eds.),  Horizontal Equity, Uncertainty, and Economic Well Being, 427 - 
467. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hutchens, Robert M. 1979. Welfare, Remarriage, and Marital Search. The 
American Economic Review 69, 369-379. 
 
Lam, David. 1988. Marriage Markets and Assortative Mating with Household 
Public Goods: Theoretical Results and Empirical Implications. Journal 
of Human Resources 23, 426-487. 
 
Mueller, Charles W. and Hallowell Pope. 1980. Divorce and Female 
Remarriage Mobility: Data on Marriage Matches After Divorce for 
White Women. Social Forces 58, 726-738. 
 
Nakosteen, Robert A., Olle Westerlund, and Michael A. Zimmer. 2004. 
Marital Matching, Earnings, and Labor Force Participation: Evidence 
from the Unmarried Population in Sweden. Journal of Human 
Resources 39, 1033-1044. 
 
Smith, James. 1979. The Distribution of Family Earnings. Journal of Political 





Smock, Pamela. 1990. Remarriage Patterns of Black and White Women: 
Reassessing the Role of Educational Attainment. Demography 27, 467-
473. 
 
Starkey, James L. 1991. Wives’ Earnings and Marital Instability:  Another 
Look at the Independence Effect. The Social Science Journal 28, 501-
521. 
 
Thornton, Arland. 1978. Marital Dissolution, Remarriage, and Childbearing. 
Demography  15, 361-380. 
 
Weiss, Yoram, and Robert J. Willis. 1997. Match Quality, New Information, 
and Marital Dissolution. Journal of Labor Economics 15, Part 2 293-
329. 
 
Wolf, Wendy C., and Maurice C. MacDonald. 1979. The Earnings of Men and 





Table A1. Variable means, standard deviations within parenthesis 
  Married once  Married at least twice 





















































































































































































































































































































































N 294,896  300,054  16,122  15,062  49,232  52,349 
* All variables except Mit measured as single the year before marriage.   
 
 
 
  